Louisiana Law Review
Volume 5 | Number 4
May 1944

Reflections on the Theory of Negligence
LeRoy Marceau

Repository Citation
LeRoy Marceau, Reflections on the Theory of Negligence, 5 La. L. Rev. (1944)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol5/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Reflections on the Theory of Negligence
LERoY MARCEAU*

The philosophy of our time is moving steadily to the conviction that human rights and human obligations, if they are to be
explained rationally or fitted into a consistent pattern, must be
based fundamentally on "act." In 1920, Professor Beale believed
that liability, or the disadvantageous side of legal relationship,
could be imputed to an individual only because of an act.' Today
*we would say that the same is equally true of the advantageous
side, and therefore of legal relations generally.
The physical effect of a given act, when described in the most
sweeping language, may be said to consist of a change in external
nature-a change ordinarily in an object or group of objects. By
virtue of the change certain qualities or conditions which would
not otherwise exist aie brought to being; and certain other qualities, which would exist but for the act, are prevented from existing. The effect of the act, when viewed statically, is the difference
between the two conditions and, when viewed dynamically, is the
substitution of the one condition for the other.
The act has thus both a creative and a destructive aspect: But
the two aspects, creation and destruction, being essentially mere
points of view from which the one act is envisioned, are by their
very nature inseparable. It is therefore to state one legal principle, rather than two, to say that both aspects, creation and destruction, are attributed by law to the actor. The qualities which are
created by the act (i.e., those qualities which would not exist but
for the act) are, if of value, placed under the dominion of the
actor and become, as we loosely say, his "property." The qualities
which are destroyed by the act (i.e., those qualities which would
exist but for the act) become, if of value, the subject of a "duty
to restore" or reimburse. Put more concisely, the actor has a jural
* Regional Attorney for the National Labor Relations Board.
1. "Starting with a human act, we must next find a causal relation between the act and the harmful results: for in our law-and, it is believed,
In any civilized law-liability cannot be imputed to a man unless it is in some
degree a result of his act. Imposition of liability, even that which seems
most extreme, is yet based upon the causation by the defendant's act." Beale,
The Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 637.
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claim to enjoy the object or qualities he creates and the jural duty
to restore the object or qualities he destroys. Thus, if a farmer
were to use his neighbor's fertilizer and seed to grow vegetables,
he would have a jural claim to enjoy the vegetables he grew, but
also a jural duty to make his neighbor whole for the fertilizer and
seed. Every act has this double aspect and double consequence;
but usually the one phase or the other can be disregarded, because
either the object created or the object destroyed is of no value.
All this assumes that the act is "voluntary" in the sense that
the actor, at the time of acting, foresees the effect which the act
will have; for only in that situation can he be said to choose the
effect. 2 As modern psychology would explain it, only when the
effect is foreseen is the mental phase of the act complete.- Because
most acts are motivated by an effect which the actor seeks to accomplish, and would not occur but for the motive, it is true that
in the great majority of the important acts of life the effects are
foreseen, if not in complete detail, at least substantially so. But
this is not always true, and the instances in which it is untrue give
rise to serious difficulties in legal theory. The purpose of this article is to consider one of these difficulties.

It is easy to say that if the effect is completely foreseen it is
attributed to the actor; and that if it is completely unforeseen it
is not attributed: But because the effect cannot be partly attributed (without being wholly attributed) it is not easy to say what
occurs when the effect is partly (but not wholly) foreseen. The
study of this situation, once largely academic, has become of in2. "For legal liability the state of mind is as important as the physical
movement. An act upon which legal liability is ordinarily based is a move-

ment resulting from volition." Seavey, Principles of Torts (1942) 56 Harv. L.
Rev. 72, 83.

3. The philosopher would express the same thought somewhat more profoundly. He would point out that within the last fifty years we have come
to look upon space and time as (for most purposes) identical, the two conceptions merely representing separate axes in a space-time continum. He
would therefore explain that to foresee something which will exist at future

time is essentially no different than to be presently aware of something
which is even now existing at a point distant in space. He would therefore
conclude that for the law to hold a man responsible for future effects he did
not foresee would be the same as to hold him responsible for a present act
or event of which he Is not conscious. The immunity, then, for unforeseen
consequences is identical with the immunity for acts performed during sleep

or coma, all being equally involuntary.
The student of history will note that the rise of the foreseeability doc-

trine in law follows very closely the rise of the space-time theory in modern
physics; and he will conclude that it is unlikely to be dislodged by the contending doctrines which, from time to time, may appear.
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creasing importance in the machine age, as it has become more
and more difficult to foresee effects in their entirety. In this article
we shall consider the situation which exists when the actor, knowing that he can foresee the effect only in part, nevertheless proceeds to perform the act. While the principles governing this situation would be the same whether we contemplate the creative or
destructive phase of the act, it is nevertheless true that the problem arises more frequently in connection with the destructive
phase; for value, although often destroyed by inadvertence, is
seldom created except as the result of careful foresight. Since the
discussion is largely philosophical, no effort has been made to
marshal the adjudicated cases, or to weigh the conclusions of secondary authorities.
Present day thought inclines to the opinion that effects follow
causes according to invariant correlations or laws so that, given
a proposed act, the effect which will follow is fixed and certain,
even to its minutest detail. 4 There is no "chance" whatever that
it will fail to occur, or that it will deviate even in the slightest
degree. But the effect, fixed and definite though it is, may be
unknown or, as we usually say, "unforeseen" by the actor at the
time of the act.
Foreknowledge of the effect, like knowledge of any other
future event, must be based upon a knowledge of present conditions plus a knowledge of the causal laws of natural science which
correlate present conditions to future conditions. If one possessed
a complete knowledge of the present, that is, a complete knowledge of all existing conditions and of all natural laws, he could
foresee the exact results of a contemplated act. On the other hand,
if he knew nothing whatever of present conditions or natural
laws, all conceivable results would seem equally possible.
Now every human actor falls somewhere between these two
extremes: He knows something but not everything about present
conditions; and he knows something about natural laws. These
partial and incomplete facts, in the knowledge of the prospective
actor, are not sufficient to determine the exact result of the proposed act: They are sufficient only to determine it within certain
4. It

is

now customary to assume that the Quantum Theory of Max

Planck, by pointing out that certain atomic phenomena are in their nature
unknowable, has cast a shadow of doubt over this supposedly impregnable
assertion. Avoiding any discussion of this highly technical field, we shall

simply say that this objection goes to the possibility of complete knowledge,
rather than to the consequences which would attend complete knowledge if
it were possible.
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limits. For this reason the individual actor, instead of foreseeing
the precise effect which will result from his act, sees rather a less
tangible concept or group of concepts-one or more classes of effects carved (by his experience) out of the whole infinity of effects which otherwise would be conceivable. The number of such
classes, their vagueness or definiteness, as well as the extent to
which they may be subdivided, depends upon the experience of
the actor and his attention to the problem. Each class of effect
will appear (to the actor) to have a certain probability ' of occurrence, i.e., of including within its bounds the effect which will
actually occur.
In the ordinary case, when one contemplates a proposed act,
a few fairly concrete alternative effects seem to be probable; and
all other conceivable effects seem nearly impossible. This becomes
more and more true as the knowledge of the individual increases.
One who tosses a coin, for example, may indeed conceive of any
result whatever. The coin may remain in the air, may disintegrate,
or may come to rest on edge. But these results appear to be highly
improbable, while one of two specific results (lighting either head
or tail) appears to be almost certain. It is because this is true with
most of the acts of everyday life that we are sometimes justified,
for practical purposes, in speaking as though the precise result of
a given action were completely foreseen, or completely unforeseen.,
II

When the court seeks to apply the-law to a particular actor,
it wants to know what classes of effects he foresees as probable at
the time of his act. Obviously the actor himself is the one who
5. "It [Probability] is a name for someone's opinion or guess as to whether a consequence will result. In fact consequences follow causes according
to invariable laws. To a sufficiently comprehensive intelligence everything
would be certain, nothing merely probable. It is only because we have not
knowledge of events, that are in themselves fixed and certain, that we have
to consider probabilities." Terry, Proximate Consequences in the Law of
Torts (1914) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 17.
6. Of course the mental aspect is never quite complete in the sense that
the actor knows with certainty that the injury will occur. He can only attain
to a relatively high probability. If the probability is very high we call the
act wilful; if it is less high we call it negligent; if it is very low, we call it
"unlucky." Very little has been done to draw the line between the wilful and
the negligent, most studies of negligence taking the form of an attempt to
draw the line between negligence and mischance. Thus we draw the lower
boundary of the field of negligence, but leave its upper boundary uncertain.
This would be a very sad state of affairs were it not for the fact that the
distinction between the wilful and the negligent is much less important than
is ordinarily supposed.
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knows, better than anyone else, the precise extent of his foresight; for he alone directly experiences it. The best evidence of
his foresight would therefore be his own statement; and this
would undoubtedly be accepted as conclusive if the court could
be sure of its truthfulness, as is the case when it is "against interest." But the question more frequently arises under circumstances in which the court cannot be sure of the truthfulness of
the actor's statement; and when it must therefore resort to what
we may call "secondary" evidence.
The accepted procedure then is to disregard the statement
of the actor and to call upon experience to reveal objectively
what the actor foresees. This is to be learned, rather roughly to
be sure but in some fashion, by recalling what others (as nearly
as possible like the actor) do in fact foresee in similar circumstances. Now unfortunately the court does not know all about
the actor; and therefore cannot apply this policy to the fullest
extent. Insofar as it can be sure of the peculiar characteristics of
the actor which might be material in deciding the extent of his
foresight, it relies upon them. For example, it would take into account his eyesight, his height, his consciousness, et cetera." But
insofar as it is not sure of the characteristics of the actor, it assumes that he is similar to a standard man or, in the language of
the books, a "reasonably prudent person."
The standard man is an ideal human unit who plays in law
a part similar to the part played in natural science by the standand physical units of physics and chemistry. The chemist, for
example, analyses the reaction of a standard cubic centimeter of
distilled water at 00 centigrade at sea level and, having learned
the precise way in which such a unit will react, is thereafter able
to predict the reaction of other and different cubic centimeters of
water by simply making adjustments in his results to allow for
the effect of the differences. In precisely the same way the law
has studied the standard man, and having learned what he will
foresee when confronted with a given set of circumstances, proceeds to conclude that the particular actor under discussion foresees the same things, except insofar as allowances must be made
7. Professor Seavey agrees and points out in great detail the facts that
are taken into consideration before the standard man test is applied.
"It would appear that there is no standardized man; that there is only
in part an objective test; that there is no such thing as reasonable or unreasonable conduct except as viewed with reference to certain qualities of
the actor .... ." Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective? (1927) 41
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 27.
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for known variations of the individual such as blindness, deafness, et cetera."
The foresight of the actor, as we have said, previsions a more
or less vague concept which we might call the "field" within
which the result must fall. Now the law is not interested in all
the characteristics of this field: But it is vitally interested in one
particular characteristic. It is interested in calculating the cumulative possibilities9 of injuries to the person or property of other
persons. It is apparent that of the infinitely large number of ways
in which the act may result, many will involve no injury to others, while of the ways which do involve such injury some may
involve greater and others lesser injury; the situation being ordinarily so complex that the actor cannot calculate the probability of injury with any great precision. As a mathematician would
express it, he cannot calculate it a priori, because he cannot divide the conceivable results into a finite number of situations
equally likely to occur; and he cannot calculate it a posteriori
because the precise situation does not occur a sufficiently large
number of times. But, while the probability of injury cannot be
exactly calculated, it can be roughly estimated by practical men.
Lloyds of London, to concur in the popular impression, in insuring against all injury, could set a premium which would come
pretty close to representing the mathematical chance of injury
resulting.
M
Let us assume that all this has been done, so that the court
has determined just what the actor foresaw and just what chance
of injury (to other persons) was involved in acting with such
prospects. How is the court to decide whether the act should be
permitted? Prior to this century, and in many quarters until recently, it was customary to reply that the act should be per8. "To find risk, we must take the standpoint of some person who has
imperfect knowledge, since if one were omniscient there would be certainty
and hence no risk. We cannot, therefore, adopt the standpoint of a supposed
observer who knows all the facts; we may not even adopt the standpoint of

a supposed observer who has standardized information in regard to the existence of events, since as to the happening of particular events there can

be no standardized knowledge. What has been done is to create a fictitious
entity, the standard man, endowing him with the knowledge of the actor...."
Seavey, supra note 7, at 7.
9. "Negligence is not gauged by the probability of injuring one in plaintiff's situation alone, but by the cumulative chances of injuring persons or
property in various situations." McLaughlin, Proximate Cause (1925) 39
Harv. L. Rev. 149, 166.
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mitted if, and only if, the standard man standing in the position
of the actor, might conceivably perform it."0
That answer was based on the assumption that the standard
man would react automatically and objectively to a given fact'
situation in much the same manner as a standard unit in physical
science, such as a gram of water, would react; and, to a superficial observer, the assumption would appear to be borne out. If
we knew nothing of the statutory speed limitation, but observed
our fellow men (i.e., the individual exemplifications of the reasonably prudent man), occasionally driving their motor cars at
speeds of 40 miles per hour, we could safely conclude that such
speeds were lawful. In the same way, in the absence of statute, if
we observed such men occasionally driving at speeds of 40 miles
per hour, we could conclude that such speeds were not in violation of common law. But, in spite of this happy situation, it is an
illusion to suppose that the standard man is acting automatically
or mechanically like a purely physical substance. His reaction is
deliberate, and is itself determined in part by the law or, more
properly, by his opinion of his obligations under the law. The
standard man, therefore, like every man, will restrict his speed
primarily to obey an obligation or to avoid a penalty-at least in
the "border line" type of case with which the courts are ordinarily confronted.
The conduct of the standard man is therefore a true indication of what the standard man believes the law to be. And because we can learn the belief of a particular actor by assuming
that, except as we establish differences, it corresponds to the belief of the standard man, the conduct of the standard man is likewise a true indication of what the actor believes the law to be.
When therefore we see the actor acting as the standard man
might act, we can safely conclude that he is doing what the
standard man considers lawful, and therefore that he is doing
10. At this late date it seems hardly necessary to point out that negligence cannot be defined as the breach of a duty to use care. There Is no
such duty in the law, care being only one of many devices by which the risk
of injury, which is involved in our actions, can be reduced below the pro-

hibited amount. No one can be exculpated simply because he uses care; or
penalized simply because he does not use it. It is true that, if one acts without using care, his action will frequently involve an unreasonably high risk

of Injury to other persons, and may therefore amount to negligence: But
the lack of care is only incidental. One can, by good fortune, act very reck-

lessly and yet not be legally negligent: And he may likewise exercise the
utmost degree of care and yet be legally negligent-a situation which, for
example, when one manufactures explosives or maintains wild animals on
his premises.
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what he himself considers lawful. So much is true. But, since
ignorance of the law excuses no one, we cannot assume that the
act is lawful simply because the actor believes it to be so. We
must further find that his belief is correct. We must decide what
the law actually is.
What reason is there to conclusively presume, as courts do
presume, that the law is precisely as the standard man thinks it
to be? 1 Why should such a presumption be made in negligence
cases, when it is not made in any other department of the law,
either in contract or in tort? At first blush, one would suppose
that the law should be determined objectively, without reference
to what the standard man, or any man, believes it to be: For inasmuch as there is no reason to suppose that the standard man
is any more able than the court or jury to decide what the law
is, there is therefore no reason for the court or jury to lean upon
the opinion of the standard man. Why then do we do so in practice?
The answer seems to be, as Justice Holmes came near to suggesting long ago in another connection, 12 that if a case is reasonably clear the judge is ready to state the law; but if it is a borderline proposition, difficult to decide, he finds it preferable to hand
it to a jury with a vague instruction that it should decide as the
11. Seavey long ago expressed the opinion that this must be done; but
nowhere is the reason explained.
"If we find that risk exists only in the consciousness of some person,
(whom we have found to be the man of ordinary prudence) the same person
must determine whether or not the risk is undue." Seavey, supra note 7, at 7.
12. "From saying that we will leave a question to the jury to saying that
it Is a question of fact is but a step, and the result is that at this day it has
come to be widespread doctrine that negligence not only is a question for
the jury but is a question of fact.
"Every time that a judge declines to rule whether certain conduct is
negligent or not he avows his inability to state the law, and that the meaning
of leaving nice questions to the jury is that while if a question of law is
pretty clear we can decide it, as it is our duty to do, if it is difficult it can
be decided better by twelve men taken at random from the street. If a man
fires a gun over a prairie that looks empty to the horizon, or crosses a railroad which he can see is clear for a thousand yards each way, he is not negligent, that is, he is free from legal liability in the first case, he has not prevented his recovery by his own conduct, if he is run over, in the second, as
matter of law. If he fires a gun into a crowded street, or tries to cross a
track ten feet in front of an express train in full sight running sixty miles
an hour, he is liable, or he cannot recover, again as matter of law, supposing
these to be all the facts in the case. What new question of fact is introduced
if the place of firing is something half way between a prairie and a crowded
street, or if the express train is two hundred, one hundred, or fifty yards
away? .... It is so easy to accept the phrase 'there is no evidence of negligence,' and thence to infer . . . that the question is the same in kind as
any other question whether there is evidence of a fact." Holmes, Law in
Science and Science in Law (1899) 12 Harv. L. ]Rev. 443, 457.
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standard man would decide.1 The standard man is resorted to in
negligence cases, not because he is of any more help there than
elsewhere, but primarily because negligence cases involve, more
frequently than not, border-line issues of great difficulty-probabilities being, in their very nature, more difficult to handle than
certainties.
Thus the adjudication of negligence cases under present law
is more or less unsatisfactory. The jury is frequently bewildered
when it is told that it must be guided, in its view of legality, by
a consideration of the way the reasonably prudent man would
have acted: For this is only to say that it must be guided, in its
view of legality, by what the reasonably prudent man would have
considered legal; or, in other words, it must judge the state of the
law as a reasonably prudent man would judge it. This is little
more than to suggest that the jury be "reasonable," and that it
14
form its judgment in a standard way. It is therefore not at all
surprising that juries quibble and divide under the long and
cumbrous instructions which are read to them with so little result
and, as some think, with so little reason, in cases involving negligence.
Iv
It is therefore a long cherished wish, in many quarters, that
our system of law may sometime begin to handle negligence
cases in the way in which it handles other cases; i.e., by using
the device of the standard man to learn the facts (just as the
chemist uses his standard cubic centimeter of water for a similar
purpose) but disregarding the opinion of the standard man as to
the law and deciding the law rather according to the opinion of
the wisest and best. In practice this would mean that the courts
themselves might undertake to say what risks can or cannot be
properly taken or, what is more probable, if they decide to leave
to the jury the question as to the legality of a particular risk,
they would outline with some particularity the standards which
should guide the jury.
13. The practice has been described

rather accurately, and with rare

humor, by A. P. Herbert.

"There has never been a problem, however difficult, which His Majesty's
judges have not in the end been able to resolve by asking themselves the

simple question, 'Was this or was it not the conduct of a reasonable man?'
and leaving that question to be answered by the jury."
Misleading Cases in the Common Law, First American Edition (1930) 14.
14. "It is because the jury is supposed to consist of standard men, and
therefore to know of their own knowledge how such a man would act in a

given situation, that questions of reasonableness and negligence are usually
left to the jury." Terry, Negligence (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 47.
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A discussion of such standards is now proceeding in American law schools. No better example can be given than the work
of Henry T. Terry, who pioneered in this project a generation
ago. 1 5 Terry believed that in deciding whether or not the actor
should be permitted to perform the act we should weigh the end
to be served by the act against the magnitude of the risk to which
others would be subjected. Carrying this principle forward, Terry
outlined the factors which should go into our evaluation. In
favor of permitting the act, we are to weigh the value of the result which the actor seeks to obtain and the probability that the
commission of the act will enable him to obtain it. In favor of
prohibiting the act, we are to weigh the value of the object which
is exposed to risk of injury, and the probability that the commission of the act will produce the injury.
The reader will observe that this is really to compute, as an
actuarian would compute, the advantages of the act in terms of
human well-being, and to weigh this against the disadvantage,
likewise computed in terms of human well-being. 16 This, as has
been so ably pointed out, is similar to the "balancing of interest"
which has been expounded in other branches of law with so much
energy and with such beneficial results to the clarity of legal
thinking.
But, while Terry clearly pointed out the two factors which
are to be weighed, he did not attempt to state what ratio the advantage must bear to the disadvantage in order for the act to be
permitted. Only the uninitiated would suppose that the ratio is
1:1 or that, in other words, the act may be lawfully performed
whenever the advantage outweighs the disadvantage by any margin, however slight. For just as the court, for his private advantage, will not permit one man to inflict an injuryupon his fellow
man, so neither will it ordinarily permit him to inflict a risk of
injury. The two situations are identical, and are therefore to be
governed by identical considerations.
15. See Terry, supra note 14.
16. "Negligence is a word used to express the value judgment that a certain activity, or in rare cases inactivity, created an undue risk of harm.
Negligence may then be said to be a characteristic of conduct which creates
an undue risk of harm. What is an undue risk varies with time and place,
and involves a value judgment on particular conduct after the risk has materialized in harm. The greater the risk, using "risk" to include both the
probability and the magnitude of the harm, and the less the utility-without

attempting to refine on "utility" for the moment-of the activity, the greater
the departure from the standard of care. There are therefore infinite degrees
of negligence ...." MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance (1940)
53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225, 1227.
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When we proceed to inquire whether, under the circumstances, and in view of the advantages involved in the act, a certain amount of disadvantage (or loss) may be inflicted on the
other person, it would seem immaterial whether the loss to be
inflicted took the form of (1) a high probability of a loss small
in amount, or (2) a low probability of a loss great in amount, so
long as the actuarial value of the loss remains unchanged. It makes
no difference, in other words, whether the act be, on the one hand,
certain to inflict a dollar's worth of damage, or whether, on the
other hand, it involves one chance in a hundred of inflicting a
hundred dollars' worth of damage. In either case the net disadvantage is the same, and Lloyd's of London, according to the popular impression, would charge the same premium to insure against
the damage.
In order, therefore, to find the criterion which will reveal
whether a small risk of great loss can be properly inflicted (in a
given set of circumstances), we should be able to inquire whether (under the same circumstances) a small but certain loss could
be inflicted. This is interesting because the law has through the
centuries evolved a set of doctrines calculated to determine
roughly when such a small loss can be so inflicted. It can be inflicted, say the books, when the advantage of the act outweigh
the disadvantages by so great a ratio as to render the commission
of the act "necessary."
Unfortunately the decided cases do not establish or even discuss the numerical value of that ratio, and a discussion of it at
this place is prohibited by consideration of space. But enough has
been said to indicate that the ratio is the same in cases of necessity as it is in cases of negligence, the two supposed branches of
the law being in reality one. To illustrate this identity let us suppose that Smith is proceeding in his motor car along the highway. If he comes to a place in the highway where a tree has fallen across the road he may drive around it, over the land of Jones,
thereby inflicting a small but certain injury. We call this "necessity." In the same way, if there is no tree but the pavement happens to be slightly wet so that skidding is possible, he may continue to drive thus inflicting a small risk of greater damage to
Jones' property. We call this "reasonable conduct" under the circumstances.
V

When we conclude that the risk involved in the act is sufficiently outweighed by the interest which the act will serve, we are

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. V

in a position to conclude that the act should be permitted and
should not be prohibited by the law. Heretofore all authorities
appear to have assumed, without discussion, that if the act is
permitted, so that neither the state nor any individual can lawfully prevent it, then (even though injury results) there can be
no damages recovered from the actor. But this view, although
unconsciously supported by the highest authority, is open to
question. There may be many instances in which the law may
find it wise to let the actor proceed, even though a risk of injury
be involved, but in which it may likewise insist that the actor
himself bear the risk. In the language of the Hohfeld analysis,
there may be instances in which the prospective actor, while
under a duty to pay damages for an injury, yet has a right not
to be prevented from inflicting the injury.
This is ordinarily the case in situations where the law confers a right of necessity. 1 7 When, for example, it permits travelers

upon a storm threatened ship to jettison the cargo of a fellow
traveler, it yet compels them to pay proportionate damages out
of the cargo thus saved."8 And where a navigator is permitted
from necessity to moor his vessel to a private wharf," he is com17. "It may with perfect consistency be held that the interest of the
actor which is served by his act may, as compared with that which is necessarily or probably invaded by it, be of such value that he should not be
punished, and that resistance should be discouraged by imposing liability
upon one who resists, while at the same time recognizing that the actor who
commandeers another's interest in and of his own necessities should pay
for any damage done thereto. Society has an interest in saving human life
and property from destruction, but its only concern with the cost of salvage
is that it shall be put upon him who, as between individuals concerned, should
bear it. As between the individuals concerned, it is obviously just that he
whose Interests are advanced by the act should bear the cost of doing It
rather than that he should be permitted to impose it upon one who derives
no benefit from the act." Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege, to Inflict Intentional
Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality. (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev.
307, 316.
18. The classic statement of this policy appears in Slater v. Hayward
Rubber Co., 26 Conn. 128, 136, (1857).
"The rule of the Rhodian law, to which all jurists refer for authority
when speaking of jettison is this: If goods are thrown overboard in order to
lighten a ship, the loss incurred for the sake of all, shall be made good by
the contribution of all. This rule or example of a rule, is found in all the
elementary books and is declared to be, as it obviously is, founded in the
highest equity and natural justice. It would be highly inequitable that the
property of one man should be voluntarily sacrificed to bring safety to that
of others involved in a common peril, without giving to the former a right
to call on the latter to contribute In proportion to the benefit received."
19. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 AtI. 188 (1908).
A violent squall threatened to swamp plaintiff's sloop. To prevent destruction of the sloop and danger to life, he moored the sloop to defendant's
dock. Defendant unmoored the sloop, destroying it and injuring plaintiff and
his family. Held, that defendant had violated a duty by unmooring the sloop.
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pelled to reimburse the owner for damages thus caused. 2 Instances could be multiplied almost without number. Thus a stowaway on an airplane may not lawfully be dropped off in mid air.
He acquires a "claim of necessity" not to be ejected; but he is
placed under a duty to pay his passage. Similarly a man accidentally bit by a dog may not lawfully be prevented from having
the dog tested for rabies; but he is placed under a duty to pay
damage to the dog's owner. Similarly a person taken ill while at
dinner at a lonely farmhouse during cold weather may not be
summarily ejected; but it is submitted that such a person must
21
pay for lodging.
Since the right to inflict small risks upon other persons (without being prevented by the law) is analogous if not identical with
the right of necessity, it is natural to assume that it (any more
than the right of necessity) should not imply an immunity from
the duty to pay damages. It cannot therefore be too strongly insisted that, if the actor foresees any risk, however microscopic,
of injury to another, there is no theoretical reason to refrain from
shifting the loss in the rare case where loss actually befalls. The
risk is created by the actor, not the actee; and so the actor could
justly be required to assume the risk and bear the loss if loss resulted. Such a rule would place the risk where it belongs. For
this reason the writer dissents from the prevailing opinion that
the ratio of advantage to disadvantage (involved in the commission of the act) should govern the right to collect damages; and
believes on the contrary that the advantages involved in performing the act should have nothing whatever to do with-the damage
issue.
Here we can anticipate a strenuous objection which, stated
most forcibly, will assume this form: Every act involves some
small possibility of injury to others and, if the actor is of average
intelligence, he realizes that this is true. Therefore, if injury
actually occurs, how can we ever say that the actor need not respond in damages? The classical view of negligence answers this
20. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221
(1910).
Defendant's steamship was moored to plaintiff's dock discharging cargo.
A violent storm arose, and the vessel was constantly pounding against the
dock. It appeared that if unmoored the vessel would drift away and be lost,
but if moored it would injure the dock. The master kept it moored. Held,
that while "the situation was one in which the ordinary rules regulating
property were suspended by forces beyond human control," the defendant
must answer in damages "to the extent of the injury inflicted."
21. See Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907) and Vincent v.
Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 211 (1910).
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question by saying that the actor need not respond in damages
if the act was permissible: But if that answer be ruled out, what
possible answer remains?
The solution of this difficulty is suggested by our general
premise that the imposition of a risk is equivalent to the infliction
of a small injury. The reader will recall that if very small (but
certain) injuries are deliberately inflicted the law refuses to
award damages, usually referring to the maxim "De minimis
non curat lex." The formalizing influence of the centuries has left
the old maxim without any very definite content but, as nearly
as can be rationalized, it seems to mean this. In deciding whether
or not to award damages, the law weighs the advantage of awarding damages against the disadvantage. The advantage of awarding of damages lies in the fact that the injured party is made
whole; and it is therefore in some way proportional to the gravity
of the injury which had been inflicted. The disadvantage is solely
the time and energy, on the part of the court, which must be spent
in handling the case-a quantity which is always substantial.
When the injury inflicted is minute in fact it is always minute in
relation to the time and energy which the court would have to
expend to handle the matter; so we say, as a general maxim, that
minute injuries will not be redressed. Risks, like definite injuries,
can be minute; and when they are extremely minute there is very
little social advantage in penalizing the individual who imposes
the risk upon his neighbor.
In the interest of practicality, therefore, and in order to preserve their energies for more important work, courts have ignored these exceedingly small risks of substantial injury, just as they
would ignore a certain, but exceedingly small, injury.2 2 The
phrase "de minimis non curat lex," with which courts dismiss
very small injuries, may never have been expressly applied to
very small risks: But a little reflection will show that it is equally
applicable; and that when the courts say that an injury is "remote," or is not a "natural consequence," or is "speculative," they
usually mean that, if the risk of inflicting the injury was foreseen
at all, it was de minimis. We refrain from shifting the loss, not
because it would do any harm to shift it, but rather because the
investigation would tax the energy of the court, would detract
22. The reader will observe the symmetry of this procedure. To decide
whether an act may be committed we are to weigh the advantages of its
commission against the disadvantages. To decide whether an act may be
redressed, we are to weigh the advantage of its redress against the disadvantage (in this case the court's time and energy).
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from its effectiveness in handling other cases, and would therefore do (practically) no good.
This truth would have been established long ago except for
an interesting historical development in the law of damages. In
the field of risks, unlike every other field of law, the wrong done
by the actor is not equivalent to the injury suffered by the other
person. One may impose a great risk, and by good fortune, the
other party may suffer no injury at all: And, on the other hand,
one may impose no risk and, by ill fortune, the other party may
("accidentally," as we say) suffer grave injury. The law could
logically award damages in the amount of the risk (i.e., what it
costs to insure against the loss) whether or not loss actually befell. Such a course would measure the damage in accordance with
the wrongfulness of the act. Our law prefers, however, to measure the damage by the gravity of the injury except in the extreme case where there is no risk imposed (i.e., "accidents" caused by the act).
If, taking the former alternative, we had decided to measure
the damages by the amount of the risk imposed, we could readily
have seen that, from a practical standpoint, very minute risks
ought not to be redressed. In cases involving such risks our law
still wisely refrains from affording a remedy even though the
damage rule we have adopted would make the award, if one were
given, substantial.
To state the matter in another way, we may say that if the
loss were entirely unforeseen, the law would not shift it, however
great it might be: And it accordingly refuses to shift it when the
loss is for all practicalpurposes unforeseen. The loss is left to "lie
where it has fallen" because the parties are, for all practical purposes, equally innocent.
An appreciation of these principles, while enabling us to attain a better understanding of most problems of negligence, will
not ordinarily change our decision in any particular case. But
there are certain situations in which the principles are determinative. The following hypothetical case, for example, would be decided for the defendant by the ordinary exponent of the "reasonably prudent man" doctrine; but it would probably be decided
for the plaintiff by one who agrees with the view here expounded.
Suppose that a motorist, Smith, accidentally severs an artery and,
while stopping the flow of blood with one hand, begins to drive
furiously to the nearest hospital and, while so driving, swerves
close to the side of the road and runs over Jones' flower bed. If
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we adopt the "reasonably prudent man" rule we must say that
Smith is doing precisely what a reasonably prudent man would
do; and that he is therefore not liable in damages to Jones. Similarly, if we adopt Terry's view of the balance of interest, we must
conclude that the vital interest which Smith has in getting to the
hospital heavily outweighs the risk, which he knowingly took, of
injury to property along the way. Those who believe in the principle set forth in this article will agree that the law should not
have prevented Smith from driving as he did. But, looking at the
matter also from the standpoint of Jones, they would say that,
inasmuch as Smith has voluntarily imposed an injury upon him,
Jones must be made whole.
Unhappily, and perhaps unavoidably, we find that we do not
greatly facilitate the solution of negligence problems by demonstrating their identity with problems of "necessity" and "de minimis"; for the principles which control the law both of "necessity"
and "de minimis" are themselves meagerly developed and ill understood. Because they are believed to apply only to unusual and
exceptional situations they were not considered important enough
to merit any serious research, and thus they were abandoned to a
state of intellectual neglect which could never have developed
had their far-reaching application been fully realized. If, as some
of our present-day philosophers assume, the coming century devotes itself to advancement in the social as distinguished from
the natural sciences, may we not hope that legal scholars will be
able to put all of these principles on a satisfactory plane by, first,
developing a technique through which the magnitude of interests
(i.e., the quantum of human well-being) can be numerically indicated and, second, by undertaking to calculate the ratio of advantage to disadvantage which suffices to establish an act as
"necessary" or an injury as "de minimis."
The lack of such a technique must justify, if anything can,the present state of our law of negligence. If it were not a bad
practice to attempt to rationalize our policy in this field, the writer would suggest that it could best be explained as follows. We
realize that, in formulating a law as to the imposition of risks,
we ought to employ two rules, one to define which risks we will
permit the actor to impose, and another to decide how' loss shall
be shifted if loss occurs. Because we have no technique for accurately measuring human well-being we find ourselves unable
to apply either rule very accurately and we therefore conclude
that, since we cannot discriminate so nicely, there is no particular
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utility in having two rules. We can simplify by having one. The
one which we keep, in most jurisdictions, appears to be Terry's
rule that we must balance the advantage, involved in the commission of the act, against the disadvantage: But even for the application of this rule our technique is inadequate. Accordingly,
despairing of our ability to apply the rule, we instruct the jury
that it may apply whatever rule a standard man would apply.
It may well be that, in the normal case, this policy yields results which are substantially correct. But, in so proceeding, it is
well to know what we are doing and why we are doing it; for
nothing but a complete understanding of the subject will enable
us to recognize the abnormal case and to decide it in a manner
consistent with our fundamental theories of justice.
VI

To sum up, negligence is the commission of an act which appears to involve an unreasonably high risk of injury to other persons. It is not the failure to exercise due care; although the exercise of such care would ordinarily eliminate the apparent risk
and would therefore eliminate the negligence.
In order to decide whether a given risk be "unreasonable,"
we must weigh the interest served by the act against the risk of
injury which is involved. It is considered reasonable only if the
interest served by the act outweighs the risk of injury by that
overwhelming ratio which, in another branch of law, would be
said to create a "right of necessity." If reasonable by this standard, the act is permitted in. the sense that the law will not prevent it and will not allow the threatened party to prevent it.
If the injury actually befalls, it must in every case be borne
by the actor (even though the risk was reasonable and the act
was permitted by law) unless the risk of loss which he inflicted
was so small as to be classified "de minimis." The usual standards
which we apply when we say that an act was not negligent, or
that its effect was not proximate, are in reality convenient devices
by which we seek to mark the boundary between the minute and
the substantial risk.

